PREPAREDNESS FOR BUSINESSES AND HOMES
CONTACT TRACKING
22.1 WHO currently defines pandemic influenza contacts as people who have had close physical contact (less than one metre) or confined airspace contact with an infected person, within four days of that person developing symptoms.
22.2 These are likely to include family members and/or other living companions, workmates (if in close contact situations or confined airspace environments), and some recreational companions. Tracking of who the sick person has been in contact with (under these definitions) therefore becomes extremely important.
22.3 People who have not been in close proximity nor have shared a confined airspace with a sick person within four days of that person developing symptoms, are not considered to be a contact.
22.4 Epidemiological evidence from a developing pandemic may change the definition of a contact and the tracking requirements. Employers should check for updated definitions and advice should a pandemic occur.
22.5 Both highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and influenza are classed as infectious diseases. In order to reduce the risk of further infection, contacts will be expected to stay at home and avoid contact with others for a recommended period. This period will be determined by the local regulatory bodies, and is not at the discretion of the employer (the material in this section is, however, in the interests of employers and employees, as well as the community at large).
22.6 The role of contact tracking may vary according to the phase of the pandemic. At an early phase, when efforts are directed at keeping the pandemic out or in managing small clusters, contact tracking and associated quarantine of cases and contacts will be vigorous. However if the pandemic affects larger numbers of people across the region, it will not be effective as a strategy to contain the pandemic, and may therefore be dropped.
22.7 In any circumstances, employers should urge sick staff members with influenza-like symptoms to return home immediately and contact a medical professional. This may involve phoning the person's normal doctor or nurse, or a specially designated centre to seek further advice, rather than the patient calling in without prior notification.
22.8 If the medical professional identifies the patient as being a suspect or confirmed case, then the medical professional will commence contact tracking in accordance with the protocols set by local Government at that time. This is likely to involve making contact with the patient's workplace.
22.9 As indicated, it is helpful for employers to:
22.9.1 Identify contacts (once an employee is suspected to be infected)
22.9.2 Advise contacts in person that they have been in contact with a person suspected of having influenza.
22.9.3 Ask contacts to go home, and stay at home until advised otherwise.
22.10 Ensure adequate hard (printed) copies of the Infection at Work Record Form are kept and maintained through the pandemic period. You may download it from our Lists and Forms Section. You are likely to be required to do so by your local authorities including tracking who the person has been in contact with.
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| 05/15/2008 04:00 PM |
| Detection Of Mortality Clusters Associated With Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza In Poultry: A Theoretical Analysis |
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Rapid detection of infectious disease outbreaks is often crucial for their effective control. One example is highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) such as H5N1 in commercial poultry flocks. There is no quantitative data, however, on how quickly the effects of HPAI infection in poultry flocks can be detected. Here, we study, using an individual-based mathematical model, time to detection in chicken flocks.
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| 05/05/2008 07:00 PM |
| Learning From The Influenza Virus' Tricks |
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Influenza is currently a grave concern for governments and health organisations around the world. The worry is the potential for highly virulent bird flu strains, such as H5N1, to develop the ability to infect humans easily. New drugs and vaccines to halt the spread of the virus are badly needed.
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| 04/26/2008 01:00 AM |
| Indonesia Runs Large Scale Bird Flu Drill |
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Indonesia is running a large scale drill simulating an outbreak of human to human bird flu that involves thousands of villagers, health workers and government officials, rehearsing for a potential pandemic. The drill started today, Friday 25th April, and is scheduled to run for three days.
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| 04/25/2008 04:00 PM |
| Heading Off A Bird-Flu Pandemic: We Need Broadly Protective Vaccines That Can Be Rapidly Produced And Administered |
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Widespread vaccination likely will be the cornerstone of public-health measures for controlling an H5N1 bird-flu pandemic, say Andrea Gambotto, M.D., assistant professor of surgery at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, and his colleagues, in this week's edition of The Lancet. However, any vaccines must be broadly protective and rapidly producible to be effective against H5N1, which is devastating in humans, the authors write in a journal Seminar.
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| 04/18/2008 08:00 PM |
| Identification Of The Common Mechanism Underlying Acute Respiratory Disease Syndrome May Lead To New Strategies Against Bird Flu |
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The Spanish flu outbreak of 1918 killed between 30 and 50 million people. In the infected patients, the ultimate cause of death was acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS). This fatal condition is a massive reaction of the body during which the lung becomes severely damaged. ARDS can be induced by various bacterial and viral infections, but also by chemical agents. These could be toxic gases that are inhaled or gastric acid when aspirated.
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| 04/18/2008 06:00 PM |
| New Vaccine May Give Long-term Defense Against Deadly Bird Flu And Its Variant Forms |
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A new vaccine under development may provide protection against highly pathogenic bird flu and its evolving forms, according to researchers at Purdue University and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention who discovered the new preventative drug and have tested it in mice.
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